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Target date retirement funds have gained favour with retirement plan investors in recent years. Typically, these funds initially have a high allocation to stocks but move towards less volatile assets like bonds and cash as the target retirement date approaches. Thus, we are told, they offer the best of both worlds -robust portfolio growth in the early years and preservation of the accumulated wealth as the investor comes closer to retirement. And the best part of all is that once enrolled there is no need for the investors to keep constant watch over their investment strategy. Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and others have highlighted the problem of inertia among retirement plan participants, which is often manifested in the reluctance to change allocation of their plan assets through time. Since target retirement funds switch assets automatically following a preset glide path laid down by the plan provider, they are thought to be an effective antidote to this apparent flaw in investor behavior.
But does the strategy of switching out of equities with time, popularly known as lifecycle investing, benefit investors? Empirical research has generally found that a switch to lowrisk assets prior to retirement can reduce the risk of confronting the most extreme negative outcomes. Lifecycle investment strategies are also said to reduce the volatility of wealth outcomes making them desirable to investors who seek a reliable estimate of final pension a few years before retirement (for example, see Blake, Cairns, and Dowd, 2001 ). On the other hand, most researchers note that these benefits come at a substantial cost to the investor -giving up significant upside potential of wealth accumulation offered by more aggressive strategies (Booth and Yakoubov, 2004; Byrne et al., 2007) . Bodie and Treussard (2007) argue that deterministic target date funds -as commonly implementedare optimal for some investors, but not for others, with suitability depending on the investor"s risk aversion and human capital risk.
Our paper questions the rationale for the deterministic nature of lifecycle switching as is the prevalent practice among target retirement funds. We argue that a dynamic switching strategy, which takes into consideration achieved investment returns, will produce superior returns for most investors. The most common argument cited by proponents of deterministic lifecycle switching is apparently straightforward -the probability that returns 3 from stocks will outperform (underperform) those from bonds and cash increases (decreases) with the length of the investment horizon. If this is true, then long horizon investors may prefer to have a higher allocation to stocks in their portfolio compared to investors with shorter investment horizons.
1 It is also argued that younger investors in retirement plans should heavily invest in stocks because they have enough time to recover from a stock market downturn should that happen and can work more to make up for financial losses. On the other hand, for older investors with a few years to retirement, holding such an aggressive portfolio can spell disaster. A major slump in the stock market just before retirement can potentially wipe away years of investment gains with little time to salvage the situation. But would this imply that investors should automatically reduce the proportion of stocks in their retirement portfolio as years go by? The following example would explain why the answer is not always yes.
Suppose an investor has a horizon of 40 years. Following popular lifecycle strategies, she decides to put most of her money in stocks for the initial 20 years and then gradually switch to bonds and cash over the last 20 years. Once this allocation decision is made, she puts it on an autopilot (like most lifecycle funds) and goes off to sleep. However, the stock market returns following the investment decision do not augur well for the investor. Due to a prolonged bear market there are several years of negative returns eroding the value of her portfolio. After 20 years, the balance in her account is next to nothing and this gets gradually switched to bonds and cash. Subsequent returns in the account are stable but low.
When our Rip Van Winkle investor wakes up after 40 years, she finds herself in a financial situation quite different from what was anticipated while setting the investment strategy.
She may even find herself poorer in real terms than she was 40 years ago.
Undoubtedly the above example is an extreme one and describes only one of the several possibilities that an investor can expect to encounter over a long horizon. Yet it reveals the Achilles" heel of the lifecycle funds currently in market. These funds follow a predetermined "Rip Van Winkle" asset allocation strategy where not only the switching of assets is always unidirectional -from stocks to fixed income -but it is also done in proportions that are pre-specified at the inception of the fund. In our example, had the 4 stock market offered very high returns during the last 20 years, the investor would stand to gain very little because her investments were automatically switched from stocks to bonds and cash during that period following the allocation strategy she had set on autopilot. The pre-programmed lifecycle strategy was blind to the fact that she had accumulated too little wealth in the initial years to necessitate switching to conservative assets. The asset switching in that case virtually ensures that she misses the only realistic chance she had to reverse her bad fortune.
The problem for the retirement plan members enrolled in target retirement funds goes even deeper than our hapless investor. Typically the plan members make regular contributions to the retirement account as opposed to a single investment made at the beginning of the 40 year period in our example. As contributions are normally a fixed percentage of the members" salaries, they are expected to grow larger over time with growth in earnings.
Therefore, as Shiller (2005) points out, the lifecycle strategy is heavily in the stock market in the early years when the contribution size is relatively small and switches out of it when earnings and contributions grow larger in later years. This can be counterproductive as by moving away from stocks to low return assets just when the size of their contributions (and accumulated fund) are growing larger, the investor may be foregoing the opportunity to earn higher returns on a larger sum of money invested. Basu and Drew (2008) confirm this view by demonstrating that the growth in portfolio size with time is important from an asset allocation perspective and by ignoring this phenomenon, lifecycle strategies tend to dampen the growth potential of the retirement investor"s portfolio in most cases.
One cannot help wondering why lifecycle funds need to have their benchmark asset allocation policy cast in stone. A possible alternative approach suggested by Basu and Drew (2008) is to switch to conservative assets a few years before retirement only if the accumulation in the retirement account meets or exceeds the plan member"s accumulation target at that stage thereby facilitating a move to lock in some of the gains. By the same token, the plan member may decide not to switch to less volatile (but low return) assets where the past performance of the portfolio has been unsatisfactory, leaving him or her with inadequate wealth relative to the target. In this case, the decision to switch or not to switch and even how much to switch at any stage depends on the cumulative performance of the retirement portfolio in the preceding years.
In this paper, we extend this alternative approach by proposing a dynamic lifecycle strategy which is flexible in adjusting its allocation between growth and conservative assets as the retirement date approaches depending on the extent that the plan member"s wealth accumulation objective has been achieved at that time. In other words, this strategy is responsive to past performance of the portfolio relative to the investor"s target return in determining the mix of assets in future periods. 2 While initially it invests heavily in equities just as any other lifecycle strategy, the switching to fixed income is not automatic.
It only takes place if the investor has accumulated wealth in excess of the target accumulation at the point of switch. Also, after switching to conservative assets, if the accumulation falls below the target in any period, the direction of switch is reversed by moving away from fixed income and towards stocks. We compare and contrast the outcomes of this dynamic strategy with those achieved by following a regular deterministic lifecycle strategy.
3
Comparing Deterministic and Dynamic Lifecycle Strategies
In comparing conventional deterministic lifecycle and dynamic lifecycle strategies, we consider the case of a hypothetical individual who joins the plan with starting salary of $25,000. The earnings grow linearly at the rate of 4% per year over the next 41 years, the duration of the individual"s working life. Throughout this period, regular annual contributions amounting to 9% of earnings go into the retirement plan account. 4 We assume that the contributions are credited annually to the member"s account at the end of each year. This means that the first contribution by the member is made at the end of the first year followed by 39 more contributions in as many years. No contribution is made in the final year of employment. 
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, which invests in 100% stocks for the 30 years after making the first contribution. After 31 years, if the portfolio value in any year matches or exceeds the target accumulation, 20% assets are switched to fixed income (equally split between bonds and cash). A failure to achieve the target performance results in the portfolio being invested in 100% equities. The performance of the portfolio relative to the target is monitored annually and the asset allocation is adjusted accordingly. In the final 5 years before retirement, if the portfolio performance at any point matches or exceeds the target accumulation at that point, 40% of assets are switched to fixed income (equally split between bonds and cash).
8
Simulating Wealth Outcomes
To 
DLC
) we use an updated version of the dataset of annual nominal returns for US stocks, bonds, and bills originally compiled by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002) and commercially available through Ibbotson Associates. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . The dataset spans a period of 105 years between 1900 and 2004 and thus captures both favorable and unfavorable returns on the individual asset classes over the entire twentieth century. However, to examine holding period returns of assets over horizons as long as 40 years, 105 years worth of returns data may not be sufficient. There are only two independent, non-overlapping 40-year holding period observations within our dataset. Any conclusion based on a sample of two observations cannot be deemed reliable.
[ Table 1 about here]
To get around the problem of insufficient data, we use bootstrap resampling. The empirical annual return vectors for the three asset classes in the dataset is randomly resampled with replacement to generate asset class return vectors for each year of the 40 year investment horizon confronting the two hypothetical retirement plan investors. Since we randomly draw rows (representing years) from the matrix of asset class returns, we are able to retain the cross-correlation between the asset class returns as given by the historical data series while assuming that returns for individual asset classes are independently distributed over time.
As the resampling is done with replacement, a particular data point from the original data set can appear multiple times in a given bootstrap sample. This is particularly important while examining the probability distribution of future outcomes. For example, 1931 is the worst year for stock market in our 105 year long dataset. In that year the return from stocks was -44% while bonds and bills offered returns of 1% and -5% respectively. Although this 
. For the purpose of doing a comparative analysis, we include two other allocation strategies -(i) a 100% stocks strategy and (ii) a balanced strategy which allocates in the ratio of 60:30:10 between stocks, bonds, and cash -in both sets of experiments and provide the results in next section.
Simulation Results
The resampling method described above generates a range of terminal wealth outcomes under the conventional lifecycle strategies and their corresponding dynamic strategies. The parameter estimates for the wealth distribution under the different strategies are reported in LC strategies invest in the same portfolio (100% stocks) for ten more years.
[ Table 2 about here]
In addition to the conventional and the dynamic lifecycle strategies, which are of primary interest in this paper, we also simulate for comparison wealth outcomes for the 100% stocks and the balanced strategy. The mean outcomes for the 100% stocks strategy are higher than both the conventional and dynamic strategy pairs. Given the existence of a large positive equity premium in our data, this is unsurprising. While the median and the first quartile outcomes for the 100% stocks strategy are higher than those of 
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. This suggests that dynamic strategies are superior in protecting investors from the risk of adverse outcomes than both the aggressive 100% stocks strategy and the conventional lifecycle strategy, which adopts a pre-determined conservative allocation in later years.
The ineffectiveness of lifecycle switching in protecting investors from the risk of confronting adverse wealth outcomes on retirement is clear when we look at the balanced fund simulation results. The balanced fund, whose mean and median outcomes are inferior to all the other three strategies, outperforms 20 , 20 LC in terms of the first quartile estimate.
This appears to put a question mark on the efficacy of the conventional lifecycle strategies.
Dynamic lifecycle strategies, again, seem to produce better results in this respect. But we take up this issue later in the paper. LC ) in terms of the mean, median, and the lower and upper quartile outcomes, can we conclude they are superior investment vehicles for the retirement plan members? This cannot be answered with certainty without comparing the entire range of outcomes under the two approaches. Stochastic Dominance is a well known approach used in this type of situation because it considers the entire distribution of outcomes.
5 It also places minimal restrictions on the investors" utility functions and makes no assumptions (such as normality) about the distributions. The Stochastic Dominance approach has been employed in a wide range of areas including investments, operations research, medicine, and agriculture. 6 We use this approach here to find out whether investors would prefer the terminal wealth distribution under one asset allocation strategy over that of the other.
Formally, given utility of wealth is a non-decreasing function i. One serious limitation of Stochastic Dominance approach in ranking alternatives is that it operates under very restrictive condition often violated in real world situations. 8 In view of this difficulty, an alternative has been proposed in the literature in the form of Almost Stochastic Dominance (ASD) (Leshno and Levy, 2002) which captures all reasonable preferences and therefore, is acceptable as an ordering criterion by most decision makers.
ASD allows for violation of the condition that F has to always remain below G for the 12 former to dominate the later as long as the area between F and G which causes the violation (left of point X) is very small compared to the total area between the two distributions. If ε denotes the ratio between the area of FSD violation and the total area between F and G, then the smaller ε is, the smaller is the area of violation relative to the full range of outcomes and more investors would prefer F over G. In other words, F is said to have "Almost FSD dominance" over G. Although the magnitude of ε presumably is different for different set of investors, an experimental study conducted among undergraduate and graduate students and mutual fund managers by Levy, Leshno, and Leibovitch (2006) estimates the value of ε to be 5.9% or 0.059. To apply the ASD rule extremely conservatively, we would consider 0 < ε < 0.01 as acceptable for dominance by ASD, where there is no clear dominance by FSD. Setting such a low threshold of 0.01 for ε would eliminate any realistic chance of error on our part in applying the ASD criterion. other CDFs, it is likely to result in a superior outcome relative to other strategies. Also, if CDF for a strategy is generally steeper than the others, the strategy can be considered to result in less variable outcomes.
[ DLC pair, the distance between the CDF plots is larger in the middle than in the extremes. In other words, the dynamic strategy dominates the conventional strategy over a range of outcomes by a wide margin.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In relation to the target accumulation outcome of $1.69 million at retirement, Figure 2 indicates that the 
strategy is larger than that of 100% stock strategy.
[ Table 3 about here]
To find out whether dominance by ASD exists between different strategies, we calculate the values of ε and provide the results in Table 3 . There is strong evidence to suggest that 
dominates the balanced strategy with the value of ε being 0.0068. However it does not dominate the 100% stock strategy under ASD criterion. The 100% stocks strategy also clearly dominates the lifecycle and balanced strategy with even lower values of ε in both cases. There is no ASD over the dynamic strategy at our set threshold ε of 1%. This result would change if the threshold is set somewhat higher, say at 5% as the 100% stocks strategy produces some spectacularly high simulation outcomes which increase the area of non-violation thereby reducing the value of ε when measuring its dominance over others. LC , the evidence for ASD in favour of the former is even stronger than that in the other pair with ε of 0.0072. Similarly, the dominance over the balanced portfolio is also slightly stronger, the ε value in this case being 0.0058. As expected, the 100% stocks strategy also dominates both the lifecycle and the balanced strategies. Comparing But what is the success (or failure) rate of the dynamic strategy over other strategies in different possible future states of the world? This knowledge is important to the investor yet comparing probability distributions of terminal wealth under different competing strategies does not provide a clear answer. This is because in doing so we are comparing the n-th percentile outcome of one strategy with the n-th percentile outcome of the other. In plain words, the good scenarios under one strategy are compared to the good scenarios under another and likewise the bad outcomes are pitted against the bad outcomes. But for any particular future state of the world (with a particular asset return path over the investment horizon), this comparison may not be very useful. For example, if stock returns turn out to be very poor compared to other assets in a particular state of the world, the 100% stocks strategy would produce inferior outcome relative to a balanced strategy no matter how attractive or dominating the wealth distribution of the former appears compared to the latter.
Recall that the asset class return path over the 41 year horizon is unique for each trial in our simulation experiment. Each of those 10,000 trials represents a different possible future state of the world. Therefore, for each trial, we compare the wealth outcomes under all four strategies, the main point of interest being how the dynamic strategy perform vis-à-vis other strategies. To be specific, we compute the shortfall probability as of 
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however increases to 26% i.e. one-in-four. However, the average size of the shortfall in both the cases is small ($34,462 and $50,273) compared to the average size of terminal wealth outcomes, which run into millions.
[ 
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, the 100% stock strategy fares better only in 43% of trials i.e. the dynamic strategy emerges winner in a majority of cases. The average size of the shortfall for the dynamic strategy in both cases, however, is quite high at $582, 815 and $343,890 respectively. This is not unexpected with the 100% stocks strategy producing several 
strategies underperforms the balanced strategy only in 10% and 11% of the trials respectively. The average size of shortfall in both cases is extremely small at $6,110 and $6,907 respectively.
While our evidence so far suggests the superiority of dynamic strategies over conventional lifecycle strategies, the saving grace for the latter may lie in the zone of the most adverse outcomes. This is represented by the left portion of X in the CDF plots in Figures 1 and 2 where the lifecycle strategies actually dominate corresponding dynamic strategies. It is also apparent from the figures that this zone is constituted by outcomes that are below the 10 th percentile mark for every strategy. To have some idea about how large the differences are between the adverse outcomes under different strategies, we report the value-at-risk (VaR) estimates at confidence levels of 99%, 95%, and 90% for both sets of simulation trials in Table 5 . We also estimate the expected tail loss (ETL) at a 95% confidence level which is essentially a probability weighted average of all below-VaR outcomes at that specified level of confidence.
, the corresponding difference, however, is smaller than $50,000.
Yet one would be reluctant to declare lifecycle funds to be the preferred investment strategy even under the assumption that investors care only about the zone of extremely adverse wealth outcomes (below 10 th percentile in this case). This is because the balanced fund produces better 95% VaR estimate than both LC . These results suggest that if the retirement plan investors are concerned about improving the floor level of possible wealth outcomes or protection from extreme downside risk, they would be better off by investing in a static balanced fund rather than a conventional lifecycle fund.
Sensitivity Analysis
How sensitive are our results to the target return used by the dynamic strategies to switch allocations? Recall that both the dynamic strategies in our study use a switching rule are based on a target return of 10% on investment. We repeat the simulation trials using target returns in the 8 to12% range but do not find any evidence of the dominance of the dynamic strategies over corresponding lifecycle strategies (and balanced strategy) disappearing at all. The results are reported in Tables 6 to 9 . An increase in target return leads to a slightly higher chance of the dynamic strategy underperforming the lifecycle strategy. For example, when the target rate of return is set at 12%, the shortfall probability of the dynamic strategy 
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is also very small (less than $5,000). Similarly, a decrease in target return results in a very small reduction in the shortfall probability of the dynamic strategies. With a target return of 8%, the shortfall probability of dynamic strategy 20 , 20
relative to lifecycle strategy 20 , 20 LC is 18%. Again, the average shortfall is slightly above $5,000. The estimates of ASD for simulations with these different target returns are remarkably similar to those with 10% target rate of return and therefore do not alter our conclusions in the previous section.
[ Tables 6 to 9 here] Another interesting point revealed by the sensitivity analysis is that as the target rate increases, the median outcome of the dynamic strategy continues to outperform that of the 100% stocks strategy by an even larger margin and vice versa. For example, by setting the target rate to 12% instead of 10%, the margin of outperformance of 20 , 20 DLC over the 100% stock strategy increases by nearly $40,000. The higher target also enables the dynamic strategies to close the gap with the 100% stock strategy in terms of mean and third quartile estimates. On the other hand, by setting a higher return target, the dominance of the first quartile outcome of the dynamic strategy over the corresponding outcome of the 100% stock strategy gets diminished considerably. In fact, 10 , 30
actually produces a lower first quartile result than 100% stocks strategy when target rate for switching is set to 12%. Similarly, the dominance of dynamic strategies over 100% stocks strategy for more inferior (below first quartile) outcomes is also adversely affected by raising the target rate for switching.
The above findings are as would be expected -the higher one sets the target rate, the higher is the likelihood that the accumulation at any point would fall below the target thereby prompting the dynamic strategy to remain invested in equities. As a result, the behavior of the dynamic strategy would closely follow that of the 100% stocks strategy.
The outcomes in the "above median" range will get better, but outcomes in the "below median" and "below first quartile" range would become marginally poorer. On the other 20 hand, if the target rate is set lower, there is a higher likelihood that the retirement account balance would cross the accumulation target at any point triggering the dynamic strategy to shift allocation towards bonds and cash. This, in turn, would cause the strategy to closely resemble a conventional lifecycle strategy
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper exposes the inherent weakness of traditional lifecycle investing for members of retirement plans. By blindly switching to conservative assets in the later part of the accumulation phase of retirement saving, lifecycle funds seem to be missing a trick. While switching out of volatile assets like stocks as the plan member nears retirement is generally accepted as sensible investment advice, traditional lifecycle funds implement this strategy in a dogmatic manner that appears to disregard the investors" wealth accumulation objectives.
As we have demonstrated, the mechanistic switching strategy from growth to conservative assets following any age-based rule of thumb is inferior to a dynamic strategy that considers the actual accumulation in the retirement account before switching assets. This paper proposes a specific dynamic asset allocation strategy where the switching of assets at any stage is based on the cumulative investment performance of the portfolio relative to the investors" target at that stage. Unlike conventional lifecycle asset allocation rules where the switching of assets is preordained to be unidirectional, this dynamic strategy can switch assets in both directions: from aggressive to conservative and vice versa. Using the simple rule of almost stochastic dominance, we show that such a dynamic lifecycle strategy would be preferred to the conventional lifecycle strategy by most retirement plan members.
When comparing percentile outcomes in our trials, the only occasion when we find lifecycle strategies do better than the dynamic strategies is in outcomes below the 5 th to 10 th percentile range. However, the differences do not appear to be large enough to negate the appeal of dynamic strategies to the average investor in view of their overall dominance over lifecycle strategies. Even for these extremely adverse wealth outcomes in our trials, we find that the static balanced asset allocation strategy generally does better than the lifecycle strategy. Therefore an investor whose sole concern is improving the floor level of the extremely adverse wealth outcomes is likely to prefer investing in a balanced fund rather than a lifecycle fund.
We have conducted a large number of trials in this paper to capture different possibilities about future asset class returns over the investment horizon of the retirement plan investor.
According to our results, the chance of the dynamic strategy underperforming the lifecycle strategy at the end of such a long horizon is small (though not insignificant). Not only does the dynamic strategy produce superior terminal wealth outcomes compared to the lifecycle strategy in a vast majority (about 75 -80%) of cases, it appears to have a fair chance of outperforming a 100% equity strategy. In fact, the dynamic lifecycle strategy 10 , 30 DLC in this paper which invests in an all equity portfolio for the first 30 years and then adjusts asset allocation on an annual basis, seems to have more than even chance of beating the strategy which invests in an all equity portfolio for the entire horizon.
It is hard to imagine that most people are so pessimistic or optimistic that they care only about the extreme outcomes. Decisions in life, including investment, are typically driven by the vast middle range of possibilities. It is precisely because of this reason that the dynamic strategy looks appealing in the context of our problem. Ignoring the extremities, the dynamic strategy invariably results in much higher wealth accumulation potential compared to the conventional lifecycle strategy. Remarkably, this is achieved while reducing downside risk compared to an all equity strategy as evidenced from the dominance of the dynamic strategy in the below median range of wealth outcomes.
In terms of practical considerations for implementation of the dynamic approach discussed in this paper, an important issue is setting the target accumulation rate. If set too high, it is unlikely to be achieved and hence the investment strategy will remain 100% stocks for most of the accumulation period. If set too low, the overall strategy may be too conservative and in essence similar to the deterministic lifecycle strategy. There are also behavioural considerations. The dynamic strategy will switch back from conservative to 22 growth assets in the final phases of the accumulation period if cumulative returns are below target. This is most likely to happen following poor returns in equities. It is likely that many unsophisticated investors, as will be typical participants in retirement plans, will be concerned about the prospect of increasing equity risk with recent losses still fresh in the mind. Hence, the strategy may be sensible from an investment perspective, particularly if there is a degree of mean reversion in returns, but difficult psychologically. An alternative might be an asymmetric dynamic approach that "banks" excess gains, but does not increase risk when returns are below target.
Overall, it appears that dynamic lifecycle strategies that respond to achieved investment performance offer scope to improve on the deterministic strategies currently most common in use. We do not suggest that the specific dynamic allocation rule proposed in this paper is the optimal strategy for all, or even most, retirement investors. But we do think that our evidence points towards the general approach that practitioners should consider in designing lifecycle funds for retirement plans. 
Notes
1 This is sometimes referred to as "time diversification". Samuelson (1989) shows that if returns are independently and identically distributed such long horizon effect cannot exist. While Samuelson"s argument is mathematically sound, mean reversion in stock returns is a well documented empirical phenomenon. For example, Poterba and Summers (1988) , provides evidence from the US market.
2 Blake et al. (2001) test an asset switching strategy that incorporates performance feedback. The similarity between their threshold strategy and the dynamic lifecycle strategy proposed in this paper is that both resort to aggressive asset allocation if the portfolio underperforms the set benchmark (or lower threshold in their case). However, the asset switching in their paper commences right after the member joins the retirement plan while in our case it starts a few years before retirement which is akin to the switching principle adopted by most lifecycle funds in retirement plans. They also set two distinct thresholds (upper and lower) to determine the direction and extent of asset switching while in this paper it is governed by a single target return.
3 Cairns et al. (2006) investigate optimal dynamic asset allocation strategies for DC investors taking account of the investor"s risk aversion and the assumed correlation between the member"s salary and asset returns. Our paper makes a more direct comparison of the wealth outcomes of deterministic and dynamic lifecycle strategies.
4 Munnell and Sunden (2006) suggest that the typical contribution rate for a 401(k) plan member is 9%.
5 Since the distribution of wealth outcomes get increasingly asymmetric over long horizons, the mean-variance framework is not useful in this situation. We also refrain from making any strong assumption on the utility function (like quadratic) of the retirement plan members. This implies that the area under F has to be equal or less than the area under G for the dynamic strategy for every W to dominate the conventional strategy by the SSD rule.
8 Take for instance the case where an investor face a choice between two uncertain prospects -a certain outcome X returning $1 and an uncertain outcome Y returning $100,000 with probability of 0.99 and $0.9 with a probability of 0.01. Whilst it is practically inconceivable that any investor would not prefer F over G, under both FSD and SSD conditions Y does not dominate X. The reason for this perverse result is that the stochastic dominance approach relates to all utility functions in a given class and therefore does not rule out extreme utility functions that provide higher expected utility under X.
